Abstract. This paper focuses on relationships between agent models and their physical realisations. Approaches on reduction from philosophical literature are analysed in a formalised manner, and extended by incorporating context-dependency w.r.t. specific makeups for their realisations. It is shown how these context-dependent reduction approaches can be translated into each other and how they can be applied to relate agent models.
Introduction
Agent models can be designed at different levels of abstraction. For example, the well-known BDI-model (e.g., [34] ) makes use of higher-level cognitive concepts such as beliefs, desires and intentions. Agent models can also be defined on the basis of the world's dynamics, and described by concepts at lower levels, for example, physical, chemical, or neurological concepts; e.g., [9, 10] . In order to ground models for embodied agents in a physical, chemical or neurological context, often the focus is on their interaction as a coupled system with the environment; e.g., [2, 11, 12, 22, 22] . However, they can be related to physical reality in a still more fundamental manner when the model of their internal functioning is fully immersed in a model of the world's dynamics, and to this end concepts from a lower level are used in the model, or it is indicated how the concepts used in the model relate to such lower-level concepts. In this way cognition can be addressed by an artifical life like approach; e.g., [10, 22, 32, 36] . This allows to model other types of mind-matter interaction, such as an agent that takes drugs which change its internal functioning (e.g., antidepressiva that affect neuro-transmitter levels), electrostimulation therapies, or brain-computer interfacing (e.g., [22] ).
It is an interesting challenge to explore how exactly a higher-level agent model can be immersed in a lowerlevel model of the world's dynamics. A related fundamental question is whether this can be done in exactly one way, or in multiple ways. For example, is cognitive functioning depending on a neurological realisation, or is a different realisation also possible? Within the philosophical literature reduction approaches are proposed to relate higher-level and lower-level descriptions (theories). In this paper three of these reduction approaches are analysed on applicability: the bridge law approach [31] , the functional approach [14, 24, 25] , and the interpretation mapping approach [37] .
The paper is organised as follows. After a brief introduction to to reduction in Section 2, Section 3 shows how the three reduction approaches can be refined to incorporate the notion of a specific makeup, thus obtaining context-dependent variants that allow multiple realisation. Here a context is defined as a specific makeup within a lower-level theory. In Section 4 in a further comparative analysis it is shown under which conditions and how the approaches can be related to each other by mutual translations. In Section 5 a practical case study illustrates the applicability of the different approaches to relate a higher-level agent models to lower-level models.
Reduction Approaches
Work on reduction can be found in a wide variety of publications in the philosophical literature; see, for example [3, 4, 5, 14, 24, 25, 31] . Reduction addresses relationships between descriptions of two different levels, usually indicated by a higher-level theory T 2 (e.g., a cognitive theory) and a lower-level or base theory T 1 (e.g., a neurological theory). A specific reduction approach provides a particular reduction relation: a way in which each higher-level property a (an expression in T 2 ) can be related to a lower-level property b (an expression in T 1 ), this b is often called a realiser for a. Reduction approaches differ in how these relations are defined. In the classical bridge law reduction approach, following [31] reduction relations are specified by (biconditional) bridge principles a ↔ b that relate the expressions a in the language of a higher-level theory T 2 in a one-to-one manner to expressions b in the language of the lower-level theory T 1 . As an alternative Kim [25] , pp.
98-102 describes functional reduction based on functionalisation of a target property a in T 2 in terms of its causal task C (specifying its causal relationships to other properties) and relating it to a state property b in T 1 performing this causal task C. For functional reduction the reduction relations are not required to be one-to-one, thus allowing multiple realisation. A third notion to define reduction relations is a (relative) interpretation mappings (e.g., [3] , [17] , pp. 201-263; [22] , pp. 61-65; [37] ). These approaches relate the two theories T 2 and T 1 based on a mapping ϕ from expressions a of T 2 to expressions b of T 1 , in the sense that b = ϕ(a).
Below in Sections 2.1 to 2.3 these three reduction approaches are introduced in more detail. In Section 2.4 they are compared.
Bridge law reduction
Nagel's classical definition of a reduction relation between a theory T 2 and a theory T 1 is based on a set of specified (biconditional) bridge principles as follows: 
Here T |─ A denotes that A is derivable from T. Note that the notation L(a 1 , …, a k ) is used here to indicate how a more complex statement is built as a proposition from subformulae a 1 , …, a k . Furthermore, note that in logical terms the theory
definitional extension of T 1 obtained by adding (new) symbols 1 for a i to T 1 and their definitions given by the biconditional bridge principles; see, for example [22] , pp. 57-61; [17] , p. 60. Every definitional extension is a conservative extension; therefore for all statements α in the language of T 1 it holds
See, for example [22] , pp. 41, 57-61; [17] , pp. 59-60, 66. From this it can be derived that the criterion for bridge law reduction has an equivalent formulation:
Here the last equivalence follows since L(b 1 , …, b k ) belongs to the language of T 1 , and the theory
is a conservative extension of T 1 . So, summarising, the following are equivalent formulations for the criterion of bridge law reduction for a law L(a 1 , …, a k ) of T 2 where
The key concept here is the specification of the bridge principles, which relate each basic expression of T 2 in a unique manner to an expression of T 1 . In practice, these bridge principles have to be biconditional to have the possibility of deriving nontrivial T 2 -laws from T 1 laws, thereby satisfying b). For example, suppose F → G is derivable from T 2 , and F*→ G* is a derivable from T 1 . Then by bridge principles F ↔ F* and G ↔ G* (since they are biconditional), the T 2 -law F → G can be derived from the T 1 -law F*→ G*. 
Functional reduction
Bridge law reduction has difficulties to handle cases where multiple realisations are possible. To cover such multiple realisation cases, the notion of functional reduction was developed (e.g., [25] 
Here the (second-order) 
Given a mental state property a, to define the role of a by the Ramsey-Lewis method, a joint causal role description C has to be chosen in such a way that: (1) a occurs in C, and (2) for every mental state property occurring in C, its functional role description occurs in C. In other words: starting with a, its functional role description has to be added, for each new mental state property occurring in the resulting specification, also its functional role description has to be added, and so on and so forth. This follows the transitive closure of the relation 'occurs in the functional role description of' between mental state properties.
An assumption is that a joint causal role specification C(P 1 , …, P k ) can be identified such that it covers the relevant state properties a 1 , …, a k of theory T 2 , and at least one instantiation of it within T 1 exists: 1 . In more precise terms, all of these T 1 -expressions L(P 1 , …, P k ) for P 1 , …, P k for which C(P 1 , …, P k ) is derivable from T 1 , are themselves derivable from theory T 1 :
Note again that (1) here the arguments indicated by P 1 , …, P k refer to state properties within T 1 ; they are secondorder variables. Furthermore, note that (2) the collection of them written down need not be the exact set of the state properties occurring both in C and in L, as these sets may differ for C and L. The P 1 , …, P k are chosen in such a way that the intersection of state properties occurring in C and L is included. These notes are relevant throughout the paper.
Reduction based on an interpretation mapping
The basic idea of an interpretation of a theory T 2 in a theory T 1 is that expressions a from T 2 are related to expressions b from T 1 by an appropriate mapping ϕ. This mapping from the expressions of T 2 to expressions of T 1 is specified in such a manner that if an expression or law L can be derived from T 2 , then ϕ(L) can be derived from
Again continuing the earlier example, suppose mental state properties a 1 , a 2 , observation obs and action act are given such that obs → a 1 → a 2 → act holds. The fact that b 1 , b 2 are considered to be realisers of a 1 , a 2 in T 1 based on an interpretation mapping is expressed by
conditions on the mapping ϕ often express that it is defined in an effective manner and is compositional, i.e., that it preserves the compositional logical structure of the expression:
These rules for preservation of compositional structure can be used to define an interpretation mapping for more complex formulae in an inductive manner, taking the mapping of atoms as a point of departure. Note that T 2 -atoms may be mapped onto T 2 -atoms, but can equally well be mapped onto more complex T 2 -formulae. Sometimes also atoms are mapped according to their structure. For example, the mapping of an atom R(f(x), g(y)) with relation symbol R, function symbols f and g and constants v and w can be based on mappings between
In such a way an interpretation mapping can be based on an ontology mapping, i.e., a mapping of the different basic ontological elements used. A variation on this is when the predicate R is mapped onto a more complex formula α(x, y), and
For more details on interpretations in formal logical literature, see, for example [37] ; [22] , pp. 61-65; [17] , pp. 201-263. For more discussion on variants of the interpretation mapping approach within philosophical literature, see for example [3] .
Comparison of the three reduction approaches
The three classical reduction approaches considered above differ in the way in which they specify reduction relations to relate expressions a in T 2 and b in T 1 , as shown in Table 1 : based on bridge principles, on causal role specifications, and on interpretation mappings, respectively. 
interpretation mapping mapping ϕ relating a and b
An interesting question is in how far they are still equivalent in some sense: unlike the different formats to specify reduction relations, is it possible to translate them into each other? For the approaches as described in the literature, for the general case the answer on this question is negative. A main reason for this is that the approaches treat multiple realisation differently. For bridge law reduction the biconditionality criterion implies uniqueness of the realiser up to equivalence: suppose for a two bridge principles a ↔ b and a ↔ b' are given with nonequivalent b and b', then by symmetry and transitivity of the logical biconditional relation ↔ within theory
does not hold within T 1 . This means that bridge law reduction implies unique realisation; it shows why multiple realisation is not covered adequately by bridge law reduction. This is different for functional reduction. In that case, by the quantification over P 1 , …, P k multiple realisation is covered, but in an implicit manner, i.e., without explicitly specifying the different options for realisation. For reduction based on interpretation mappings the situation is still different. If an interpretation mapping is specified, this indicates just one realisation, so in that sense this does not support multiple realisation. However, it does not exclude the existence of different (non-equivalent) realisers, as bridge laws do due to their biconditional character. It is quite well possible that two interpretation mappings ϕ and ϕ' exist such that not for all a it holds ϕ(a) ↔ ϕ'(a). This shows that reduction based on interpretation mappings does not exclude multiple realisation, but using just one mapping does not provide a specification covering it. However, if multiple interpretation mappings are used, it will be able to cover multiple realisation in an explicit manner. Such a type of extension will be made in the next section. It will be set up in a more general form by making contextdependency of a set of realisers explicit so that it can be applied to the other two approaches as well.
In summary, from the three approaches mentioned, functional reduction is able to handle multiple realisation, but in an implicit manner. The interpretation mapping approach can be extended when multiple mappings are taken into account, so that multiple realisation is covered in an explicit manner. Bridge law reduction is not able to handle multiple realisation. However, as a way out, in [14] , pp. 233-236, Kim briefly sketches how what he calls a local or structure-restricted form of bridge law reduction, can handle multiple realisation. His suggestion is to relativise bridge principles a ↔ b to
by adding an extra parameter S indicating the context of a specific system or makeup of an organism. Below in Section 3, in line with [38] , it is shown how a variation on this idea of context-dependent reduction can be worked out in more detail for each of the three reduction approaches considered. Thus refined variants are obtained making multiple realisation explicit by reference to the context-dependency of a specific realisation. It will turn out that systematic relationships between these three refined approaches exist (see Section 4 for mutual translations).
Context-Dependent Reduction
In context-dependent reduction as introduced in [38] , the aim is to identify a set of contexts and to relate the different realisations to these contexts. When contexts are defined in a sufficiently fine-grained manner, within one context the realisation can be unique. In this case, from an abstract viewpoint contexts can be seen as a form of parameterisation of the different possible realisations. For example, in Cognitive Science such a grouping could be based on species, i.e., groups of organisms with (more or less) the same makeup. If mental state properties (for example, having a certain sensory representation) are assumed that can be shared between, for example, biological organisms and robot-like systems it may be useful to allow contexts that are described within different base theories. Therefore in the contextdependent reduction approach developed, a collection of (base) theories T 1 is assumed and for each theory T in T 1 a set of contexts C T , such that each particular context 2 of an organism or system is formally described by a pair (T, S) of a specific theory T in T 1 together with a specific context S in C T . The contexts S are assumed to be descriptions in the language of T and consistent with T. The theories T in T 1 and contexts S in C T can be used to distinguish the different realisations that are possible. Below it is shown how this can be done for the three approaches considered. Note that when the collection of theories T 1 is taken a singleton {T 1 } consisting of one theory T 1 and the set of contexts C T1 is taken a singleton {S} consisting of the empty specification S = φ, then the original general reduction approach is obtained.
Context-dependent bridge law reduction
For the bridge law reduction approach, the set of realisers that exists within one context S for a theory T in T 1 , is expressed by context-dependent biconditional bridge laws parameterised by a theory T in T 1 and a context S in C T , specified by
Given such a parameterised specification, the contextdependent criterion of bridge law reduction for a law L(a 1 , …, a k ) derivable from T 2 can be formulated (in two equivalent manners) by 3 :
Note that context-dependent bridge law reduction implies unique realisers (up to equivalence) per context: from a ↔ b T,S and a ↔ b' T,S it follows that b T,S and b' T,S cannot be non-equivalent in T ∪ S. So to obtain contextdependent bridge law reduction in cases of multiple 2 For the sake of shortness a context (T, S) is often indicated just by S. 3 Note that the notation L(a1, …, ak) is used to indicate how a more complex statement is built as a proposition from subformulae a1, …, ak. Furthermore, the theory T ∪ S ∪ {a1 ↔ b1,T,S, …, ak ↔ bk,T,S} is a definitional extension of T ∪ S obtained by adding (new) symbols for ai to T; see, for example [9] , p. 60; [35] , p. 57-61. Every definitional extension is a conservative extension; therefore for all statements α in the language of T it holds T ∪ S ∪ {a1 ↔ b1,T,S, …, ak ↔ bk,T,S} |─ α if and only if T ∪ S |─ α ; see, e.g., [9] , pp. 59-60, 66; [35] , p. 41, 57-61.
realisation, the contexts are defined with a grain-size such that per context a unique realisation exists.
Context-dependent functional reduction
For a given collection of context theories T 1 and sets of contexts C T , for context-dependent functional reduction a first criterion is that a joint causal role specification 4 C(P 1 , …, P k ) can be identified such that it covers all relevant state properties of theory T 2 , and for each theory T in T 1 and context S in C T at least one instantiation of it within T exists:
The second criterion for context-dependent functional reduction, concerning laws is
In general this notion of context-dependent functional reduction may still allow multiple realisation within one theory and context. However, by choosing contexts with an appropriate grain-size it can be achieved that within one given theory and context unique realisation occurs.
The unique realisation context criterion (also called strictness criterion) expresses this as follows. For each T in T 1 and context S in C T there exists a unique set of instantiations realising the joint causal role specification C(P 1 , …, P k ), or formally:
This guarantees per theory T and context S unique realisers, parameterised by T and S. When also this third criterion is satisfied, a form of reduction is obtained that we call strict context-dependent functional reduction. When the strictness criterion is satisfied, the universally quantified form for relations between laws is equivalent to an existentially quantified variant: 4 This specifies the causal relationships of these properties to each other and to other (external) properties; this can be obtained by the RamseyLewis method as described in [23] , [27] , [33] .
Context-dependent interpretation
To obtain a form of context-dependent interpretation, the notion of interpretation mapping is generalised to a multimapping, parameterised by contexts. A contextdependent interpretation of a theory T 2 in a collection of theories T 1 with sets of contexts C T specifies for each theory T in T 1 and context S in C T an appropriate mapping ϕ T,S from the expressions of T 2 to expressions of T: a multi-mapping
from theory T 2 to theories T in T 1 parameterised by theories T in T 1 and contexts S in C T . Such a multimapping is a context-dependent interpretation mapping when it satisfies the property that if a law L can be derived from T 2 , then for each T in T 1 and context S in
Usually the mappings are assumed compositional with respect to logical connectives, as expressed in Table 2 . Table 2 Compositionality of an interpretation mapping for logical connectives
S (A1 ∧ A 2 ) = ϕ T,S (A 1 ) ∧ ϕ T,S (A 2 ϕ T,S (A1 ∨ A 2 ) = ϕ T,S (A 1 ) ∨ ϕ T,S (A 2 ) ϕ T,S (A 1 → A 2 ) = ϕ T,S (A 1 ) → ϕ T,S (A 2 ) ϕ T,S (¬ A) = ¬ ϕ T,S (A) ϕ T,S (∀x A(x)) = ∀x ϕ T,S (A(x)) ϕ T,S (∃x A(x)) = ∃x ϕ T,S (A(x))
Note that also here within one theory T in T 1 and context S in C T multiple realisation is possible, expressed as the existence of two essentially different interpreation
mappings ϕ T,S and ϕ' T,S , i.e. such that in T ∪ S it may not hold that ϕ T,S (a) ↔ ϕ' T,S (a).
However, an additional strictness criterion to obtain unique realisation per context is formulated as follows: when for any given theory T in T 1 and context S in C T two interpretation mapping ϕ T,S and ϕ' T,S are possible, then for all a it holds
S (a) ↔ ϕ' T,S (a)
When this additional criterion is satisfied as well, the interpretation is called a strict context-dependent interpretation.
Mutual Translations
In this section it is shown how the context-dependent interpretation mapping approach can be related to the other two context-dependent approaches by mutual translations.
Relating bridge law reduction interpretation
In this subsection it is shown how bridge law reduction can be translated into reduction based on a strict interpretation mapping and vice versa.
From interpretation to bridge law reduction
Suppose a strict interpretation mapping ϕ T,S is given, which is assumed compositional. For each basic expression a of T 2 specify the bridge principle
T,S with b i,T,S = ϕ T,S (a i )
If L(a 1 , …, a k ) is law derivable from T 2 involving state properties a 1 , …, a k , then
By compositionality of ϕ it follows that T ∪ S |─ L(ϕ T,S (a 1 ), …, ϕ T,S (a k )).

Therefore it follows T ∪ S |─ L(b 1,T,S , …, b k,T,S ).
This shows that the criterion (ii) for bridge law reduction is fulfilled. Note that it is needed to assume the interpretation to be strict. If the same translation would be done for two essentially different non-strict interpretations ϕ T,S and ϕ' T,S , it would lead to contradictions.
From bridge law reduction to interpretation
For a translation the other way around, assume bridge principles
are given for the basic expressions a i of T 2 , such that the bridge law reduction criterion (ii) is fulfilled:
Define the mapping ϕ T,S as follows. For each basic expression a i of T 2 , based on the given bridge principle a i ↔ b i,T,S , define
S (a i ) = b i,T,S
For more complex expressions extend this by compositionality as described in Table 2 . For this …, a k ) by the bridge law reduction criterion (ii) it follows by compositionality:
S (L(a 1 , …, a k )).
Therefore the criterion for an interpretation mapping is fulfilled. Note that the two translations from bridge law reduction to interpretation and from interpretation to bridge law reduction as given are each others' inverse. Moreover, note that the context-dependent interpretation obtained from bridge law reduction is strict. When within a given theory and context an essentially different interpretation would be possible, this could be translated into bridge laws as well, which would lead to a contradiction.
Relating interpretation to functional reduction
Next it is shown how functional reduction can be translated into an interpretation and vice versa.
From functional reduction to interpretation
Let a theory T in T 1 and a context S in C T be given. Take a joint causal role specification C(P 1 
Pick an arbitrary set b 1 , …, b k of realisers satisfying C(P 1 , …, P k ) in T ∪ S, and define
For more complex expressions extend this by compositionality as described in Table 2 . For L(a 1 , …, a k ) derivable from T 2 , by the functional reduction criterion it holds:
As the antecedent holds due to the choice of the mapping, it follows that
By the compositional definition of ϕ T,S for more complex expressions, as before, it follows: 1 , …, a k ) ).
Therefore the interpretation mapping criterion is fulfilled for the chosen mapping ϕ T,S . Note that a mapping ϕ T,S as defined above fully depends on the chosen set of realisers of the joint causal role specification C(P 1 , …, P k ). This may result in a collection of possible mappings for each instantiation of P 1 , …, P k satisfying C(P 1 , …, P k ) in T ∪ S. This can be avoided by assuming the additional criterion of unique realisation context:
Using this (i.e., assuming strict context-dependent functional reduction), per theory T and context S a unique interpretation mapping is found. This is a strict interpretation mapping, because any essentially different interpretation mapping would provide another set of realisers within the same context.
From interpretation to functional reduction
Suppose a context-dependent interpretation mapping ϕ T,S
(T∈T 1 , S∈C T ) is given, which is assumed compositional. Moreover, let L(a 1 , …, a k ) be derivable from T 2 . Let a theory T in T 1 and a context S in C T be given. Then by the interpretation mapping criterion it holds
S (L(a 1 , …, a k )) and hence by the compositionality assumption it holds T ∪ S |─ L(ϕ T,S (a 1 ), …, ϕ T,S (a k )).
Assume that a joint causal role specification is given by C(a 1 , …, a k ), which means T 2 |─ C(a 1 , …, a k ) holds. The interpretation mapping criterion applied to C(a 1 , …, a k ) provides 1 , …, a k ) ).
By the compositionality assumption it holds ϕ T,S (C(a 1 , …, a k )) = C(ϕ T,S (a 1 ), …, ϕ T,S (a k )).
Hence from T 2 |─ C(a 1 , …, a k ) it follows T ∪ S |─ C(ϕ T,S (a 1 ), …, ϕ T,S (a k )).
Therefore, if the variables P 1 , …, P k are instantiated by
Now this only shows that for some instantiation of the variables P 1 , …, P k the functional reduction criterion holds, not for all instantiations. In fact for the general case the following weaker existential criterion is implied:
This weaker existential criterion is (only) equivalent to the stronger universal criterion when it is assumed that exactly one unique set of instantiations of the variables P 1 , …, P k is possible within context S for theory T such that C(P 1 , …, P k ) holds (unique realisation criterion).
Therefore to obtain a faithful translation it is assumed that ϕ T,S is a strict context-dependent interpretation. In such a case if an essentially different realising instantiation of C(P 1 , …, P k ) would be possible, this would lead to an essentially different interpretation mapping (see previous translation), which is excluded by the criterion of strictness. Thus by the translation discussed above, both (equivalent) universal and existential versions of the criterion for strict context-dependent functional reduction are satisfied:
Relating Agent Models
In this section the concepts discussed above are illustrated for a case study involving a higher-level cognitive model CM and two lower-level models: a neurological model NM and a biochemical model BM. The neurological model NM will be described by a general neurological theory NT and a specific makeup NS, describing a specific context. Similarly, the biochemical model BM is described by a general biochemical theory CT and a specific makeup CS, which describes (in a simplified form) the context of the bacterium E. coli. Based on the neurological theory NT and biochemical theory CM and the neural example context NS and the biochemical context BS of E. coli, the context-dependent interpretation (ϕ NT,NS , ϕ BT,BS ) for the cognitive model CM is defined:
The cognitive model CM
This model plays the role of the higher-level theory. It describes a simple cognitive process which depending on observations on two world facts s1 and s2 makes a choice between two actions a1 and a2. It is specified as follows:
The neurological model NM
For the neurological model a situation is taken involving two objects. When a cube is seen and no sphere, it will be taken, when a sphere is seen and no cube, it will be taken. When both are seen, only the sphere is taken. The neurological model NM used consists of the general laws specified in (simplified) neurological theory NT and a specific neural makeup described by NS.
Neurological theory NT Activations of neurons propagate via connections through synapses with positive (excitory) or negative (inhibitory) effects. In case of multiple connections to one neuron, the effect is combined, and activation takes place when this combined input is above the neuron's threshold. When a sensor stimulus occurs that is connected to a neuron, then this neuron is activated, when the input is above its threshold. When the combined input for an action is above its threshold, then this action occurs. This is formalised as:
Note that here the predicate connectedto is used to represent all combined positive input for a neuron and all combined negative input for a neuron. Moreover, note that for convenience in the last line some world relations have been included. Fig. 1 
Neural makeup NS (see
Mapping the cognitive model onto the neural model
Given the cognitive model CM and the neurological model NM, the next step is to relate them by a reduction relation. As in Section 4 it was shown how the different context-dependent reduction approaches can be translated into each other, it is only shown for one of them: the interpretation mapping approach. The cognitive model CM is mapped onto the neurological model NM by the interpretation mapping ϕ NT,NS defined by (and extended to more complex propositions in a compositional manner according to Table 2 ):
For example, the relation
of the cognitive model is mapped by ϕ NT,NS as follows: (CM) . This shows that the criterion for interpretation is satisfied.
The biochemical model BM
Within cell biology causal chains are known in the form of chemical pathways from the environment to within the cell. For example, such causal chains justify to interpret the presence of an internal concentration of CRPcAMP above a certain level as an indicator for 'glucose being absent in the external environment', and of the internal presence of a certain concentration of lactose as an indicator for 'lactose being present in the external environment'. This shows ways in which a cell is able to build and maintain internal states that can be interpreted as a world model, or its beliefs about the world. Intentions can be considered to be present in the cell in that, depending on the observed environment it is able to make an informed choice (for preparation of an action) between alternatives of specific import action to provide resources for a specific type of metabolism. See [19, 20] for more detailed models for intracellular processes underlying bacterial behaviour. For the simplified example considered here, the biochemical theory BT consists of general biochemical laws indicating how certain types of substances in general can react with each other. The makeup BS of E.coli specifies the presence of a specific cell membrane, a water-like fluid inside of appropriate temperature, and the presence of specific substances within the cell, such as DNA. 
Mapping the cognitive onto the biochemical model
The cognitive model CM can be mapped onto the biochemical model BM by the interpretation mapping ϕ BT,BS defined by:
Again the mapping is extended for more complex propositions in a compositional manner (see Table 2 ). For example, the relation
of the cognitive model is mapped by ϕ BT,BS as follows: The relationships for action generation derivable from BT ∪ BS cover transcription (DNA affecting the presence of mRNA), translation (mRNA affecting the presence of enzyme), cathalysis (enzymes affecting the related import reactions), and the effects of (co)factors in these steps (also see Fig. 2 ). These relationships are the mapped relationships from CM, formally: ϕ BT,BS (CM) . This illustrates the fulfilment of the criterion for interpretation.
Discussion
Agents described by a higher-level model can have different physical realisations. In this paper it was shown how some of the approaches on reduction available in philosophical literature can be applied to relate such a higher-level agent model to its physical realisations. Below a number of aspects and implications of this work are discussed.
Context-dependency of physical realisation
As the three approaches to reduction do not treat multiple realisation in an explicit manner, refined variants of all three approaches were used making multiple realisation explicit by reference to the context-dependency of a specific realisation. The notion of context-dependency distinguishes the general rules or laws of an underlying theory from more specific aspects such as a particular makeup of an agent, for example, the general rules for neural systems in contrast to a particular neural architecture. It turned out to be possible to obtain systematic relationships between the three refined context-dependent reduction approaches, in the form of mutual translations between them. The treatment as presented abstracts from the dynamic aspects (following what is usually done in the philosophical literature mentioned). A topic for future work is to make these dynamic aspects explicit, by considering a form of temporal logic.
In a case study it was shown how based on the machinery developed a cognitive agent model can be related both to a realisation by a neural model and by a biochemical model. Here the neural and the biochemical model each consist of a generic part specifying general laws or rules, and a specific part specifying the particular makeup considered. The higher-level cognitive model unifies basic properties of the two different lower-level models and describes them in a more abstract manner.
Evaluation in other case studies
Two other case studies can be mentioned that illustrate the approach presented here. The first one addresses the relationship between a biological and a cognitive agent model for criminal behaviour; see [7] for details. Here the notion of interpretation mapping is used to obtain clarification of the cognitive model in relation to underlying biological factors. As an example of a relation between basic concepts, a desire for aggressive behaviour is related to the biological factor testosterone level. Other relationships can be found in Table 3 . Table 3 Relationships for the criminal behaviour case study
Cognitive Conceptualisation
Biological Conceptualisation
Another case study addresses the relationship between cognitive and biological agent models for emotion reading; for details, see [28] . For example the cognitive state srs(s) for sensory representation of a stimulus s is related to activation of sensory neurons SRN(s) for s. For some more relationships, see Table 4 . 
Mind-matter interaction
Mind-matter interaction plays an important role in a number of applications; for example, see [22] . One application area of such mind-matter relationships concerns the use of drugs which affect cognitive functioning, as often plays an important role in the functioning of humans, for example persons suffering from depression, psychiatric patients, or criminals with deviant brain structures; e.g., [6] . On the one hand dynamical system models exist that estimate the concentration of drugs in the blood (e.g., [18] ), and on the other hand models that describe cognitive functioning, but those models are rarely formally integrated or related to each other; e.g., [8] . Another application area for mindmatter relationships is brain-computer interfacing; see, for example, [14] , [29] , [30] . Here by monitoring the physical states of the brain, estimations are made of a human's cognitive states, and used for example, to control a machine or a wheel chair. For both application areas mentioned, to provide integrated formal models for the mind-matter interaction involved is an interesting challenge still to be addressed. By having (in addition) a realisation of a higher-level agent model, it becomes possible to incorporate mutual effects between the physical world and an agent's internal functioning. Within the framework presented here, effects of the world on the agent's functioning in principle can be modelled as a change from the agent's makeup S to a changed makeup S' (for example, a drug that affects the activation threshold of neurons, or inactivation of certain genes at the cell's DNA). In general such a changed makeup S' can be a realisation of the same or of another higher-level agent model.
Model-driven development of agent applications
Model-driven software development is an important recent development within software engineering; e.g., [15] , [26] , which also induces developments in application areas in the context of the Internet and software agents; e.g., [13] , [16] , [1] . For this type of application areas in particular reusable agent model libraries are being set up. Traditionally agent models have a symbolic, logical character, suited for qualitative applications. However, it is more and more recognized that quantitative applications based on numerical models are important to be addressed for agents as well, especially for applications dealing with continuous world dynamics and more complex adaptive types of behaviour; e.g., [9] . Therefore among agent models in libraries also such numerical models are to be included. Various examples of such numerical models can be found in the areas of neural (and complex adaptive) systems modelling. The scope of applications for agent systems can be substantially extended when such models are available in libraries in formats that enables reusability and integration. Reusability will be supported more when the formats used in such a library allow different views on the same model according to different levels of abstraction. A formalised context-dependent reduction relation (in the form of an interpretation mapping or bridge laws, or function reduction relation as described in the current paper) can be used to relate such views to each other. An example of an application area where different views and their relations may be relevant are embodied agents such as found in robotics, where both a physical model and a cognitive model may be useful descriptive means. Other examples which can benefit from such agent models concern application areas where adaptivity is important, such as adaptive and personalised Web applications.
Possibilities for automated support
The concepts and formalisations presented here can be used for model conceptualisation and specification, thereby relating ontologies used and defining different views taking such relationships into account. However, the conceptual machinery may also be useful by establishing relationships between existing agent models. The question can be put forward in how far automated support can be developed to verify whether a reduction relation between existing models holds; for example, to check whether a given (ontology) mapping provides an interpretation mapping, i.e., to check whether the condition
is fulfilled for a given T∈T 1 and S∈C T . Here the properties L can be just taken as those defining the specification of T 2 , which is a finite (and maybe not too large) set. For each of such properties L, to automatically check whether
holds using available tools for model checking and/or theorem proving seems a feasible route to be explored. This is left for future work.
